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Abstract
In this paper, we theoretically analyze Microsoftʼs tying practice in the instant messenger
market. Using a model that highlights distinct features of the instant messenger, which are
diﬀerent from the cases of the web browser and the media player, we show that Microsoft can
leverage its monopoly power in the operating system (OS) market to the instant messenger
market through tying strategy. Microsoftʼs messenger tying hurts consumers because it enables
Microsoft to monopolize messenger market and so fully exploit consumerʼs willingness to pay
to the OS-messenger bundle. However, since tying saves installing costs, consumer loss is not
so serious that total surplus improves under messenger tying. Finally we show that such results
are robust to the possibilities of multi-homing in the instant messenger market.
Keywords: Microsoft, instant messenger, tying, foreclosure, multi-homing
JEL Classiﬁcation: L12, L41, L86
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＊ Corresponding authorI. Introduction
In recent years, Microsoftʼs bundling behavior has become an important issue in
applications software markets. Particularly the lawsuits against Microsoftʼs tying practices in US
for the web browser and in EU for the media player have provoked signiﬁcant attentions from
lawyers, politicians, economists, and etc.
1
A similar case, meanwhile, has occurred in Korea, which has one of the highest diﬀusion
rate of high-speed Internet network in the world
2; Daum Communications (Daum), a domestic
instant messenger service provider, accused Microsoft of its alleged bundling, contending that
Microsoft was attempting to monopolize Korean instant messenger market by selling Windows
XP tied with the Windows Messenger, virtually the same product as Microsoftʼs MSN
Messenger.
3 Actually the market share of MSN Messenger in Korea was only 13% when
Microsoft ﬁrst launched Windows XP at the end of 2000, however, had increased even up to
70% during the next four years. The question is whether such a tipping toward MSN
Messenger in Korea was due to the Microsoftʼs tying behavior and/or whether it was anti-
competitive, just as in the cases of web browser in US and media player in EU.
4
The instant messenger market, even though it inevitably shares many common features
with web browser and media player markets, also has several unique characters so that we can
directly apply neither existing theories of tying nor the experiences of the web browser and the
media player markets. Therefore, let us brieﬂy illustrate the main characteristics of the instant
messenger market, particularly focusing on some key features distinct from the web browser
and the media player markets.
First, since instant messengerʼs main function is enabling its users to communicate with
one another, it has not only indirect but strong direct network externalities, while only indirect
network externalities exist in the web browser and in the media player markets. Second, what
makes such direct network externalities have even more signiﬁcant importance is the fact that
there is no compatibility among diﬀerent messenger programs in Korea. Without compatibility,
the network size becomes an powerful strategic variable, probably more eﬀective than price and
quality, in inducing customers.
5 The special importance of the direct network externality in the
instant messenger market, together with the incompatibility constraint, is the main diﬀerence
from the cases of web browser and the media player.
Third, the price of the instant messenger programs is zero, like web browser, in the sense
that they can be downloaded from the Internet for free. Zero price can be an optimal pricing
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1 While the web browser case in US has not been ﬁnished yet, at least oﬃcially, EU Commission has adjudicated
Microsoft guilty for the case of media player.
2 As of 1999, among the countries with more than 10 million Internet users, Korea has the highest Internet diﬀusion
rate. See Dholakia et al. (2003) for details.
3 The instant messenger provides users with real-time communications services, unlike e-mail.
4 On 7th December 2005, the Korea Fair Trade Commission decided to levy ﬁnes against Microsoft, and ordered the
company to sell, for the next 10 years, both Media Player and Windows Messenger separately from Windows or
otherwise allow its rival companiesʼ products as tied-in items together with Microsoftʼs products. In response to this
measure, Microsoft had appealed to the higher court, but recently in October 2007, withdrew the appeal.
5 In fact, Microsoft has demanded the compatibility among instant messengers in US where the instant messenger
market was somewhat pre-empted by AOL, however in Korea, Microsoft is technically preventing other instant
messengers from being compatible with MSN Messenger.strategy since the instant messenger has dual sources of making proﬁt, that is, is a two-sided
market, just like newspapers, magazines, TV broadcasting markets; ﬁrms might earn more
proﬁts indirectly via advertising on the basis of the number of its customers, that is, the
network size, than directly from the subscription fees. Thus, Microsoft can have a strong
incentive to capture the instant messenger market even though consumers use the messenger
program for free.
6
Finally, as in the cases of web browser and media player, however, diﬀerently from the
standard tying cases in literature, tying Windows Messenger with Windows XP cannot directly
foreclose other competitors from the market since customers can easily and freely substitute any
other instant messenger program for the pre-installed Windows Messenger without any
technical problem.
7 That direct foreclosure via tying is impossible is also very important in
analyzing tying eﬀect in the instant messenger market.
Tying, or tie-in sale, has been thoroughly investigated by a number of economists,
focusing on monopolistʼs incentive and its welfare eﬀect; i.e., whether ﬁrms can gain any
additional proﬁts through tying, and whether it is harmful or not for consumers and for the
whole society. The conventional conjecture, known as the leverage theory, is that a monopolist
with market power can possibly obtain higher proﬁts by forcing his consumers to purchase the
tied product together, that is, by leveraging its monopoly power to the tied market.
However, this seemingly innocuous leverage theory has faced strong criticism; particularly
the Chicago school economists point out that there is only one monopoly proﬁt obtainable
regardless of tying or independent selling, in case that the tied product market is competitive.
For example, Posner (1976) contends that the monopolist cannot beneﬁt from tying when the
tied product is a complementary good of the primary (or tying) product, as in the cases of
instant messenger, web browser, and media player. The reason is that, if a monopolist charges a
higher price on his tied product than the competitive market price level, then consumers will
regard the increase of the tied product price as the increase of the tying product price and so
will buy less of the primary product. In this case, therefore, the monopolist will have no
incentive to employ tying.
8
Whinston (1990) notices the importance of the market structure in predicting tying eﬀect
and shows that, if the tied market is oligopolistic and the tying good is not essential for the use
of tied good, the monopolist can exclude the rivals and earn higher proﬁts in the tied good
market through tying, contrary to the Chicago argument. However, Whinston also re-conﬁrms
Posnerʼs contention for the case that tying and tied products are complementary in ﬁxed
proportions, which is more relevant assumption to analyze OS and applications software
together. The intuition is that, if a monopolistʼs tying product is essential for the tied products,
monopolist can always extract maximum proﬁts from the complementary product simply by
putting consumersʼ surplus into the price of his primary product. Actually, the monopolist
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6 Making proﬁt from advertising may not be the only reason to monopolize instant messenger market. Protecting
monopoly position in the OS market may be the other reason as in Carlton and Waldman (2002).
7 That is, customers can easily switch to other instant messengers at the expense of some extra installing costs, which
involve a series of costs that the consumers need to pay to actually use the product. For instance, in order to use
DAUM instant messenger instead of pre-installed MSN Messenger, one needs to connect to the Internet, to ﬁnd the
Web sites that freely oﬀer DAUM instant messenger program, and to download and install it.
8 Some articles, in the same vein, explore tying arrangements on the positive side. See Bowman (1957), Burstein
(1960), Blair and Kaserman (1978), Schmanlensee (1982) for the details.would prefer that the competitors with high quality product continue operations in the
complementary market, since then he can possibly raise the price of primary product even
further as much as consumerʼs surplus from using the competitorsʼ high quality products.
Note that most of the existing theories of tying are mainly concerned with the so-called
ʻold industryʼ. However, such traditional tying theories can hardly be directly applied to the
ʻnew industryʼ like Internet and software programs, and etc. It is because there are several
distinct characteristics in new industries compared to the old industries as we examined; there
exist direct and/or indirect network externalities, marginal cost and the price are close to zero,
direct foreclosure is not possible, and consumers can use more than one brand at the same time,
and etc.
Carlton and Waldman (2002) establish a new tying theory for the application software
industries by incorporating some, but not all, of these special features of the ʻnew industryʼ into
their model. Particularly, when network externalities are important, they show that the
monopolist of a primary market has an incentive to tie in order to monopolize the
complementary good market, and tying may be harmful for the society since it deprives
consumers of the opportunity of consuming better quality brands.
However, even Carlton and Waldman (2002) cannot be directly applied for the instant
messenger market analysis since they do not consider the other key characteristics of the instant
messenger. First, in Carlton and Waldman, the main reason for tying is to protect the monopoly
position in the OS market. Therefore, if there is no entry threat in the OS market, and if there
are competitors with high quality and/or product diﬀerentiation in the instant messenger market,
the monopolist in the OS market will not use tying strategy since it reduces the proﬁt from the
primary market as Whinston (1990) contends. Second, in Carlton and Waldman (2002), tying
has a direct and perfect foreclosing eﬀect, however, in case of instant messenger, as we
emphasized earlier, tying itself cannot directly foreclose other competitors; consumers can still
freely download other messengers compatible with Windows, and multi-homing is also
possible.
In this paper, with a new model which incorporates such key features of the instant
messenger market, we analyze Microsoftʼs tying incentive, its eﬀect on the market structure,
and the resulting impact on social welfare. The main results are as follows: First, tying
indirectly, or gradually, forecloses other competing instant messengers, even those with superior
qualities, and so deprives consumers of the chance to use better messenger programs. Second,
tying hurts consumers because it enables Microsoft to charge a maximum price to its OS
product, that is, to fully exploit consumerʼs willingness to pay to the OS-messenger bundle.
Third, however, total surplus will increase via tying; consumerʼs loss due to tying is not that
large, being compared to the increase of the monopoly ﬁrmʼs proﬁt, because tying saves
consumersʼ installing costs. Finally, such results are robust to the possibilities of multi-homing
in the instant messenger market.
II. Model
Consider operating system (OS) and instant messenger markets together. In the OS market,
brand A is monopolistically provided by ﬁrm 1, that is, by Microsoft. Meanwhile, the
messenger market is a duopoly where ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 oﬀer B1 and B2 respectively for free.
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of B2 is higher than that of B1 by b>0. For simplicity, we normalize B1ʼs quality as 0 so that
B2ʼs quality is b. Marginal production costs of A and B are assumed to be zero without loss of
generality, however, there are per period ﬁxed costs FA>0a n dFB1=FB2=FB>0 for both
markets.
Consumers choose one messenger out of two alternatives so that, since OS is required for
the instant messenger program, either (A, B1)o r( A, B2) is used as a bundle by each consumer.
9
Note that, unlike standard tying models, since messenger B2 can be downloaded for free from
the Internet and also can be used with product A substituting pre-installed B1 without any
technical problems, tying of B1 to A cannot directly foreclose B2 in the messenger market.
Consumers obtain utility both from the OS and from the messenger. The utility from the
OS, product A,i sV, and the utility from the messenger is Ni+bi,s, where Ni denotes the
number of consumers who are using Bi and thus captures the network eﬀect of the messenger,
bi is brand i ʼs quality, and s is the installing cost of the messenger, which is the same for B1
and B2. As we assumed, b1=0a n db2=b>0, and s occurs only when the consumer chooses a
messenger which is oﬀered independently from the OS, so that s=0 for B1 if it is oﬀered being
tied with product A.
To highlight the dynamic aspect of network building and the foreclosure mechanism in our
messenger tying analysis, we adopt a (T+1)-period discrete model such that t {0,1,2,...,T},
where T can go to inﬁnity.
10 At t=0, ﬁrm 1 decides whether to oﬀer B1 being tied with A or
independently. Every period from t=1, new consumers of total mass S, who are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, S] according to their installing cost s, enter the OS-messenger
markets. New consumers, on entering, buy A and choose either B1 or B2. From t=2 , there are
two consumer groups; S newcomers and (t,1) S existing customers. We assume that S
newcomers ﬁrst choose messengers given each brandʼs current network size up to period (t,1),
and then the (t,1)S existing customers decide whether to stay with the current messenger or to
switch to the other one given the new network sizes updated by the newcomers.
In each period, after both of new and existing consumersʼ decisions, there are advertisings
on instant messenger. Advertising on messenger incurs no additional cost to the messenger
provider, while total revenue from advertising is proportional to the network size, that is, the
number of consumers who are currently using the messenger at that period. Let a be the per-
consumer advertising revenue.
III. Monopolization by Tying
In this section, we will show that ﬁrm 1 can monopolize market B by tying B1 with A.L e t
N
t





that the market shares were the same before ﬁrm 1ʼs tying decision.
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9 In Section V, we will explore the case of multi-homing, which means that consumers have additional option of
using both messengers at the same time.
10 For simplicity, the discount factor is assumed to be 1.Assumption 1. 2b<S<
V
2
In Assumption 1, 2S<V means that the utility from OS are suﬃciently large compared to
the messenger installing cost, which seems true in reality. What is more important in
Assumption 1 is b<
S
2. It means that we focus on the case that B2 is of better quality than B1,
however, the quality advantage is not too big. If bC0, then tying strategy is not necessary for
ﬁrm 1 to monopolize the instant messenger market. On the other hand, if
S
2<b,t h e nt h e
quality advantage of B2 is so substantial that ﬁrm 2 will be the winner in the messenger market
in spite of the tying strategy by ﬁrm 1. These two cases are trivial and so uninteresting because
they are just consistent with the standard competition results. Assumption 1 focuses on the case
that tying can oﬀset rivalʼs quality advantage, which might be anti-competitive.
First consider independent selling. Without tying, the utility of the consumer with
installing cost of s who ﬁrst enters OS-messenger market at t=1i sU1=V,s for (A, B1)a n d
U2=V+b,s for (A, B2), and therefore all the consumers will buy (A, B2). For any tB2,
utilities of the new consumers from (A, B1) and (A, B2) become U1=V,s and
U2=V+(t,1) S+b,s respectively, which means that all the newcomers for every period will
buy B2. Furthermore, the existing customers will never switch to B1 simply because it does not
have any positive networks. Therefore, ﬁrm 1 will exit from the messenger market and ﬁrm 2
becomes the monopolist in market B.
Next, consider the tying case. Lemma 1 shows that the speed of foreclosure by tying
depends on S and b.





, which is monotonically decreasing from 3 to 2 as t goes from 1 to inﬁnity.
Furthermore, let t
* be the minimum t {1, 2,..., T} such that SBf (t)b. Then ﬁrm 1 can capture
the whole market B from t
*+1.
<Proof> See Appendix 1.
From Lemma 1, we can see that the speed of foreclosure depends on S and b:G i v e nS, t
*
increases as b increases, that is, foreclosure is more diﬃcult as the quality advantage by B2 is
bigger. Given b, t
* decreases as S increases, which means that monopolization becomes easier
as the cost of installing B2 becomes larger. However, note that ﬁrm 1 can always monopolize
market B after a ﬁnite period of time for any S and b. Therefore, we have Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the low quality messenger B1 can foreclose the high
quality messenger B2 through tying strategy.
Even though the quality of B1 is lower than that of B2, ﬁrm 1 can strategically foreclose
ﬁrm 2 and monopolize the messenger market by tying B1 with the main product A,t h e
Windows OS, which is solely provided by ﬁrm 1. It could be obvious that the monopolist can
foreclose the rival messenger by tying despite the quality deﬁciency, if all consumers face a
large installing cost. However, what if the installing cost is substantial to only a fraction of
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messenger market with the help of her superior quality, because some consumers with low-
installing costs would still use the rival messenger simply by installing it by themselves.
Proposition 1, considering huge network eﬀects in the messenger market and consumersʼ
switching decision, argues that the monopolist can foreclose the rival messenger by tying even
in this case, since the number of ʻtake-what-is-oﬀeredʼ consumers will eventually become large
enough that the rival messengerʼs quality advantage is overwhelmed by the diﬀerence in
cumulative network size after all.
The next question is whether ﬁrm 1 actually has an incentive to monopolize the messenger
market through tying strategy. Consider independent selling case ﬁrst. As we showed earlier, if
there is no tying, the high quality brand B2 captures the whole messenger market and so the
consumers will buy system (A, B2). At any period tB1, since the messenger price is zero, the
newcomerʼs willingness to pay for the system (A, B2) is uniformly distributed on
[V+(t,1)S+b,S, V+(t,1)S+b,0], so that we have a downward sloping demand for
product A as in <Figure 1>.
Since ﬁrm 1 exits from the market B, its proﬁta tt is p
t
1=PA}QA(PA),FA, where PA and
QA are the price and the quantity of good A, respectively. Then it is easy to show that the
optimal price of good A is V+(t,1)S+b,S under Assumption 1.
11 To sum, when the OS
and the messenger are sold independently without tying, messenger market is monopolized by




Next, consider the tying case. If ﬁrm 1 employs tying strategy, it can monopolize the
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11 Intuitively, since V is suﬃciently large, ﬁrm 1ʼs optimal strategy is to charge the maximum price that induces all
the consumers regardless of their installing costs.







sSmarket B from t
*+1 . Market B is temporarily a duopoly up to t
*, however, it eventually
becomes a monopoly from t
*+1 on. Since we focus on the long-term eﬀect of tying on the
market performance, we will only consider ﬁrm 1ʼs proﬁt after that critical time t
*. Note that
newcomerʼs willingness to pay for the bundle (A, B1) at time t>t
* is V+(t,1)S. Since tying
eliminates both quality diﬀerential and installing cost from the analysis, every newcomer has
the same willingness to pay, and therefore, the demand for the bundle is a horizontal line as
depicted bold in <Figure 2>
Firm 1ʼs proﬁt under tying is p
t
1=[V+(t,1) S]S,FA,FB+atS by charging
P
t
A=V+(t,1)S on the OS product, where atS is the advertising revenue which wouldnʼtb e
obtained if ﬁrm 1 does not employ the tying strategy. Tying raises ﬁrm 1ʼs proﬁtb y( S,b)S
(area B+C+D in Figure 2) + atS,FB. Thus, we can conclude that ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to
monopolize messenger market through tying strategy as long as the long-term gain from tying
(S,b+at)S is greater than FB, which seems to be easily satisﬁed in reality since ﬁxed cost in
the instant messenger market is substantially small and the network size continuously increases
over time
Proposition 2. If (S,b+at)SBFB, then ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to tie its messenger B1 to the
main product A so that it can monopolize the messenger market.
IV. Anti-competitiveness of Messenger Tying
In the previous section, we conﬁrm that ﬁrm 1, who is the monopolist in the OS market,
has both incentive and power to monopolize the messenger market by using a tying strategy. Is
it socially desirable or harmful? In this section, we will show that such tying strategy lowers
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Δconsumer surplus, while it improves total surplus. As before, we only consider the long-term
eﬀect of tying after t=t
*.
Consider consumer surplus ﬁrst. Consumer surplus at time t>t




0 [V+(t,1)S+b,s]ds,[V+(t,1) S+b,S] S=
1
2S
2>0 (area A+B+Ci n
<Figure 2>). Meanwhile, consumer surplus under tying is zero because ﬁrm 1sets the price of
the OS at V+(t,1)S which is equal to consumerʼs willingness to pay. That is, under tying,
consumerʼs willingness to pay is fully exploited by ﬁrm 1, who now is the monopolist in both
OS and messenger markets. Note that, under independent selling, ﬁrm 1, even though it is the
monopolist in the OS market, should have lowered its OS price to induce consumers with high
installing cost in the messenger market. However, tying enables ﬁrm 1to charge a maximum
price on OS, and thus lowers consumer welfare.
Now consider total surplus. Let W
I and W
T be the total surplus at t>t
*, ignoring advertis-





0 [V+(t,1)S+b,s] ds and W





Tying improves total surplus. W
I and W
T are represented in the <Figure 2> by the area
(A+B+C+E+F+G+H) and area (B+C+D+E+F+G+H), respectively, so that the
welfare diﬀerential is exactly the area (D-A), which is positive by the assumption S>2b.
Proposition 3. Tying the low quality messenger B1 with OS lowers consumer surplus but
increases total surplus.
Tying hurts consumers because it enables Microsoft to charge a maximum price to its OS
product, that is, to fully exploit consumerʼs willingness to pay to the OS-messenger bundle.
However, total surplus will increase via tying; consumerʼs loss due to tying is smaller than the
proﬁt gains of the monopoly ﬁrm.
V. Multi-homing
One of strong arguments by Microsoft during consecutive hearings in Korea was that tying
would not generate tipping in the instant messenger market under multi-homing. In this section,
in response to this argument, we extend our basic model to incorporate multi-homing
possibility, and show that the main results of the previous sections still hold.
Assume that B1 is being tied with product A by ﬁrm 1. Since multi-homing is possible,
consumers choose one out of three options; to use B1 only, to use B2 only, and to use both B1
and B2 together, each of which is denoted by (A, B1), (A, B2), and (A, B1/2), respectively. At




2 +b,s,a n d
V+N
t-1
U +b,s, respectively, where N
t-1
U is the number of the whole consumers, that is, (t,1)
S. Under multi-homing, N
t
i should be cautiously understood; N
t
i is the number of consumers
who choose either (A, Bi)o r( A, B1/2), since a consumer who uses Bi can communicate not just
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12 Since ﬁxed costs and advertising revenue are symmetrically included in both W
I andW
T, ignoring these variable
makes no change in comparing total surplus.with those who use Bi only, but also with those who use B1 and B2 together. Therefore, the
network eﬀect of multi-homing (A, B1/2) is that from the whole messenger market.




2=tb for all t {1, 2,..., T}.
<Proof> First note that, when B1 is already installed being tied with OS, ʻchoosing B2 onlyʼ is
strategically dominated by ʻchoosing B1/2ʼ. Therefore, none will choose ʻB2 onlyʼ, and all the




U=tS "t {1, 2,..., T}.
Then, since newcomerʼs utility of choosing the two alternatives are V+(t,1)S and V+(t,1)
S+b,s, respectively, those with s and b such that sBb choose (A, B1), while the others
choose (A, B1/2). Therefore, at any period, the number of newcomers who choose (A, B1)i s
S,b a n dt h a to f( A, B1/2)i sb. Furthermore, there is no switching from the existing consumers,








Under multi-homing, since the network eﬀects are the same for both (A, B1) and (A, B1/2),
consumers with high installing cost choose option (A, B1) in order to save the installing cost,
and those with low installing cost choose multi-homing option (A, B1/2) to enjoy the beneﬁt
from the better quality brand B2. However, there is no consumer who uses B2 only, since it is
strategically dominated by the multi-homing option. Every consumer chooses either (A, B1)o r
(A, B1/2), and therefore, the network size of ﬁrm 1is always the whole market (i.e., N
t
1=tS),
while that of ﬁrm 2 is only a part of it (i.e., N
t
2=tb<tS). Thus tying is an eﬀective tool to
restrict the growth of ﬁrm 2ʼs network, in spite of the fact that B2 is of better quality than B1.
Whether ﬁrm 2 can survive in the messenger market depends on both advertising pattern
and ﬁrm 2ʼs market share compared to the ﬁxed cost. First, assume that the advertising revenue
is simply proportional to the network size as before. In such case, if ﬁrm 2ʼ market share is
large enough to earn more advertising revenue than the ﬁxed cost, that is, if atbBFB, it will
stay in the messenger market against ﬁrm 1ʼs tying strategy, and if atb<FB, it will be
foreclosed by tying as under single-homing. Note, however, even in case of survival, ﬁrm 2ʼs
growth will be restricted by N
t
2=tb<tS despite itʼs quality advantage. Next, assume that, since
advertisers do not want to duplicate their advertising expenditure, they advertise only on B1,
which is used by the whole consumers. If this is the case, ﬁrm 2 will exit from the messenger
market by ﬁrm 1ʼs tying strategy even under multi-homing.
Proposition 4. Under multi-homing, if advertising is not duplicated, messenger tying by
Microsoft can foreclose the better quality competitor. Meanwhile, if advertising is duplicated,
the better quality competitor will stay in the messenger market with restricted growth in case
that atbBFB, and it will exit, otherwise.
Microsoft claims that the rival messenger will not be foreclosed under multi-homing,
because consumers will simply use both messengers together. However, we show that the rival
messenger still can be foreclosed by monopolistʼs tying strategy, if a large portion of the
revenue in messenger markets is acquired through each ﬁrmʼs ʻeﬀectiveʼ network size, the
number of consumers who exclusively use it. Note that the consumers who use both
messengers have very little value from a messenger ﬁrmʼs perspective, since the selling price of
such consumers in advertising market will easily go zero by price competition between
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because it does not bring her eﬀective network size. (The growth of the rival messenger will be
severely restricted even in case that it can stay in the market.)
Will the welfare implication of tying change under multi-homing? First, without tying,
ﬁrm 2 will be the monopolist in the messenger market, as under single-homing, since B2 is
preferred to B1 by all the consumers. Then, ﬁrm 1will set PA at the lowest possible level to be
able to induce even the lowest willingness-to-pay consumer, that is, the consumer with
b,s=b,S<0. Since PA is the lowest, consumer surplus is the highest possible and ﬁrm 1ʼs
proﬁt is the lowest, as in <Figure 1>.
Now assume tying. If ﬁrm 2 exits from the messenger market due to tying, then the
welfare analysis will be the same under single-homing, which means that consumer surplus
decreases and total surplus increases due to tying even under multi-homing. Meanwhile, if ﬁrm
2 stays in the messenger market, ﬁrm 1will set PA enough to induce the marginal consumer
with the lowest willingness to pay to the OS product, that is, the consumer with
b,s=b,b=0. (Note that PA should be the same for both (A, B1) -consumers and (A, B1/2)-
consumers.) In such case, consumer surplus is lower, because PA is higher, than under
independent selling, however, total surplus increases due to tying. As PA increases, ﬁrm 1ʼs
proﬁt from OS selling increases more than consumer surplus decreases; in <Figure 2>,t o t a l
surplus increases by D (note that it was D-A under single-homing) since consumers who are
using B2 still enjoy surplus equal to A.
Proposition 5. Under multi-homing, tying lowers consumer surplus and increases total surplus,
as in Proposition 3 under single-homing.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Instant messenger market has several distinct features such as strong direct network
externalities, incompatibility, zero price, two-sided market, and impossibility of direct
foreclosure through tying. We need a new model to analyze the tying practice in the instant
messenger market because not only the two related lawsuit cases, the web browser case in US
and the media player case in EU, but current literature about tying do not fully incorporate such
key features of the instant messenger market. This paper is an attempt to develop a relevant
theoretic model for the tying practice in the instant messenger market.
The three main claims/results throughout the paper can be summarized by i) the possibility
of foreclosure by tying, ii) the incentives/proﬁtability of tying, and iii) the anti-competitiveness
of tying. Admittedly, the ﬁrst part is not of great interest ‒ some authors even “assume” this
result (Carlton & Waldman 2002, as an example). But the second aspect of tying has been
questioned and studied thoroughly by many economists, and is the key contribution of this
paper. According to previous literature, the monopolist has no incentives to employ tying if the
tied goods are complementary to primary goods and there is no entry threat in the primary good
market (Whinston 1990; Carlton and Waldman 2002). However, in this paper, we show that the
monopolist may want to tie even the complementary good (messenger) to her primary good
(OS), if the complementary good markets are two-sided markets. The basic reason is that the
monopolist now deals with two diﬀerent groups of “consumers” in messenger markets: the one
ANTI-COMPETITIVENESS OF INSTANT MESSENGER TYING BY MICROSOFT 2011] 195group of consumers who are the “users of the messenger” and the other group who are the
“companies making advertising campaign on the messenger users”. Note that the former group
of consumers views the messenger as a complementary good to OS, but the latter does not.
Since the main source of revenue for the monopolist is the latter group rather than the former,
she is no longer able to use her monopoly position in OS market to extract all the (advertising)
proﬁts from messenger markets, unless she retains the messenger users by herself. Therefore,
the monopolist may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to tie her messenger to the OS in order to foreclose other
competitors in the messenger market after all, even though the messenger is a complementary
good and there is no threat in the OS market.
Microsoft has an incentive to capture the instant messenger market because then it can
charge a higher price to the OS product, in addition to earning advertising revenue from the
instant messenger market. Even though tying itself cannot directly foreclose other competitors,
it can induce some of the customers who newly enter the messenger market to choose MSN
Messenger by saving installing costs. Due to the strong network externalities without
compatibility, then more customers, newcomers and the existing customers, will choose MSN
Messenger to enjoy its large network size. The instant messenger market will be tipped toward
MSN Messenger and ﬁnally other competing messenger providers will exit from the market.
Tying MSN Messenger with Windows XP can indirectly monopolize the instant messenger
market in this manner, even in case that MSN Messenger is inferior to other competing brands
in terms of quality.
Such tying practice by Microsoft is harmful to the consumers because they have to pay a
higher price to the OS so that their surplus will be fully exploited, if Microsoft monopolizes
instant messenger market through tying strategy. Even though tying can improves total surplus,
such an increase in total surplus is due to the increase of the Microsoftʼs proﬁti nt h eO S
market at the cost of the consumer surplus. Since Microsoft is not a domestic company, total
surplus cannot be a good measurement of social welfare of Korea. Therefore, we conclude that
the instant messenger tying by Microsoft in Korea is possibly anti-competitive due to its
detrimental eﬀect on consumer surplus.
It is needless to say that our conjecture about the Microsoftʼs anti-competitive tying
behavior needs both further theoretic and empirical tests. This paper is only an attempt to
develop a model that is more relevant to analyze the instant messenger case, which has many
diﬀerent key features from the web browser and the media player cases, and also from the
standard tying models. We hope this paper provokes further theoretic and empirical studies on
the Microsoftʼs tying practice in the instant messenger market.
APPENDIX 1
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof is done by two-steps: First, we will prove the following claim by mathematical induction, and



















2 (S,2b)  for S<f(t) b, that is, for
t<t
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that the claim holds for any t=m<t
*,1, and we will show that the claim holds for t=m+1<t
*.A





Then consumers with sBc(m) will choose (A, B1), while those with s<c (m) will choose (A, B2), hence










2 (S,2b) . Note that c(m)>0 if and only if S<f(m) b.B y
observing the behavior of the newcomers, existing consumers decide whether to stay or switch. The utility
of the existing customer of (A, B1)i sU1=V+(N
m
1 +S,c(m)) if he stays with (A, B1), and
U2=V+(N
m
2 +c(m))+b,s if he switches to (A, B2). Note that U1,U2=S,3c(m)+s>0, since sBc(m)
and 2c(m)<S. That is, all the existing customers who are using (A, B1)w i l ls t a yw i t h( A, B1). Next, the
utility of the existing customer of (A, B2)i sU1=V+(N
m
1 +S,c(m)) if he switches to (A, B1), and
U2=V+(N
m
2 +c(m))+b if he stays with (A, B2). Note that U1,U2=S,3c(m)<0 if and only if S<f(m)
b. So, all the existing consumers using (A, B2) will continue to stay with (A, B2). Since no existing



















































Thus we show that the claim holds for t=m+1, too. The claim holds for all t as long as the condition
S<f(t)b is satisﬁed, that is, as long as t<t
*.
Step 2: Note that the convergence of f(t) makes sure that there exists a ﬁnite t
* such that SBf(t)b for
tBt
*.A tt
*, the behavior of the newcomers and the existing consumers who are using (A, B1) are the same
as at t<t
*, while that of the existing consumers who are using B2 changes since SBf(t
*)b ; all of them
switch to B1 because U1,U2B0. Since the number of these switching consumers is N
t*-1














*). In the next period t
*+1, all
the newcomers will choose B1 since c(t
*+1)C0. Thus the network sizes that the existing consumers face
become (t
*+1)S,c(t
*) for B1 and c(t
*) for B2. Then it can be easily veriﬁed that all of the existing
consumers, regardless of their previous choice, will choose B1. Thus, ﬁrm 1monopolizes the instant
messenger market through tying from t
*+1. Q.E.D.
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